Finding an effective metric used for bijective

S-Box generation by genetic algorithms by Baicheva, Tsonka et al.
Finding an effective metric used for bijective
S-Box generation by genetic algorithms
Tsonka Baicheva, Dusan Bikov, Yuri Borissov, Limonka Lazarova,
Aleksandra Stojanova, Liliya Stoykova, Stela Zhelezova
Introduction
In cryptography, S-box is a basic component of symmetric key algorithms
which performs nonlinear substitution. S-boxes need to be highly nonlinear, so
that the cipher can resist linear cryptanalysis.
Let B = {0, 1} and Bn = {0, 1}n. Every function f : Bn → B is called Boolean
function of n variables:
Bn = {f : B
n → B}, |Bn| = 2
2
n
.
Let f1, f2, . . ., fm ∈ Bn. Mapping F : B
n → Bm defined by the rule:
F (x) = (f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fm(x)),
is called vectorial Boolean function and f1, f2, . . ., fm are its coordinate functions.
S-boxes transform n-binary input into m-binary output. Let S be the sub-
stitution table of an n-binary input into m-binary output mapping, that is, if
B = {0, 1},
S : Bn → Bm, x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)→ y = (y1, y2 . . . , ym) = S(x)
S can be considered as a vectorial Boolean function, consisting of m individual
n-variable Boolean functions f1, f2, . . ., fm, referred to as coordinate Boolean
functions, where fk : B
n → B and fk(x) = yk ∈ B, k = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
The main cryptographic interest has been with reversible, or bijective, S-boxes.
An (n × n) S-box S is called bijective, if S is an invertible mapping over Bn.
Bijective S-boxes represent permutations of their 2n inputs.
For cryptographic Boolean functions, nl(f) must be close to the maximum to
prevent the system from attacks by linear approximations, correlation attacks,
fast correlation attacks.
A Boolean function f onBn
2
is also uniquely determined by its Walsh-Hadamard
transform. The Walsh-Hadamard transform fW of f is an integer valued function
defined by:
fW (a) =
∑
x∈Bn
2
(−1)
f(x)+〈a,x〉,
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where 〈a, x〉 is scalar product.
Linearity Lin(f) of the Boolean function f is defined by usingWalsh-Hadamard
transform with the following:
Lin (f) = max
a∈Bn
2
|fW | ≥ 2n/2.
Linearity and nonlinearity of a Boolean function are connected by the relation:
nl (f) = 2n−1 − 1
2
Lin(f).
Walsh-Hadamard Transform spectrum of f(x) is the set of all 2n spectral
coefficients for the elements in Bn.
WHT Spectrum Matrix is the matrix of WHT spectrum of all coordinate
Boolean functions.
An S-box S is referred as a Bent S-box, if its WHT SpectrumMatrix is entirely
flat. Bent S-box has the highest possible nonlinearity. It itself is not suitable for
our purposes – it is not balanced and exists only for even n ≥ 2m. From now on
we will talk about bijective S-boxes.
The main criteria for cryptographically strong (n× n) S-box are:
• High nonlinearity;
• High algebraic degree;
• Balanced structure;
• Good autocorrelation properties.
Our task was to give some suggestions for finding an effective metric used for
generation bijective optimal S-Box. Because of the given problem’s complexity,
our group considered different approaches and we gave a few suggestions for
problem solving.
Group suggestions
Bear in mind given problem we focus on achieving good performance according
to the nonlinearity criterion finding S-box close to Bent one.
• Change the initial parent pool
Genetic algorithms represent the heuristic approaches for S-box generation.
Each genetic algorithm start with an initial parent pool of bijective S-
boxes, P1, P2, . . ., Pt,. Till now it is used as Pi random or AES S-boxes.
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b0,0 b0,1 b0,2n−1
b1,0 b1,1 b1,2n−1
...
... . . .
...
b2n−1,0 b2n−1,1 b2n−1,2n−1
Figure 1: S-box – a vectorial Boolean function
w0,0 w0,1 w0,2n−1
w1,0 w1,1 w1,2n−1
...
... . . .
...
w2n−1,0 w2n−1,1 w2n−1,2n−1
Figure 2: WHT Spectrum Matrix of S
We propose exponential S-boxes as the initial parent pool. Exponential
S-boxes are proven to have good cryptographic properties [1].
• Change the cost function
In genetic algorithms it’s necessary to be able to evaluate how good a po-
tential solution is relative to other potential solutions. The fitness function
is responsible for performing this evaluation and returning a fitness value,
that reflects how optimal the solution is. In the considered algorithm fitness
value is based on two functions: fitness – measuring S-box nonlinearity and
cost – measuring flatness of WHT Spectrum Matrix, i.e. how close is it to
Bent one. For now cost function is evaluated by:
p
√√√√2n−1∑
j=0
|wi,j −wi,j+1|
p
for p ≥ 1. The lower its value is the better the solution is.
◦ The cost function can be computed by using the maximum of the dif-
ferences between the spectral coefficients of each coordinate function.
Let ∆i be the maximal difference of i
−th coordinate:
∆i = {|wi,j − wi,j+k| : j ∈ (0, 2
n
− 1), j + k ≤ 2n − 1} .
We can calculate the maximal difference for given S-box as:
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∆S = max∆i, i ∈ (1, 2
n − 1).
WHT Spectrum Matrix of Bent S-box is entirely flat, so ∆Bent = 0. If
∆S1 ≈ ∆S2 then the second condition can be used. The vectors of maximal
differences for two S-boxes (∆1, ∆2,. . ., ∆2n−1) of S1 and (∆1, ∆2,. . .,
∆2n−1) of S2 are considered and the ∆i = 0 values are counted and the
S-box which has more ∆i = 0 is chosen as a good one.
◦ Another cost function can be computed by using the dispersion of the
WHT spectrum of each coordinate function. Statistical dispersion is zero
if all the data are the same and increases as the data become more diverse.
Let a0, a1,. . ., a2k be possible values of the WHT spectrum matrix and pi,j
be the probability of appearing aj in the i
−th column. Then the mathemat-
ical expectation is
E(wi) =
2k∑
j=0
ajpi,j.
The dispersion of the i−th column of the WHT matrix with respect to the
bent WHT Spectrum (2
n
2 ) is:
D(wi) = E(w
2
i )− (2
n
2 ) =
2k∑
j=0
a2jpi,j − 2
n.
The dispersion of the S-Box is:
D(S) =
1
2n − 1
2
n
−1∑
i=1
D(wi).
Smaller dispersion means flatter spectrum and better S-box.
• Examine smaller S-Boxes
Natural requirement for 4 bit S-boxes is an optimal resistance against lin-
earity and differential cryptoanalysis.The optimal values for Lin(S) and
Diff (S) are known for dimension n = 4, but they aren’t determined for
higher dimension. More precisely, for any bijective mapping S : B4
2
→ B4
2
we have Lin(S) ≥ 8 and Diff (S) ≥ 4.
Our suggestion is to examine the behavior of the genetic algorithm on 4×4
S-boxes and compare the results with the already known optimal ones [3].
74
ESGI’104 Finding an effective metric used for bijective S-Box
This can give verification of the method and some suggestions for the cost
function.
• New approach
It is considered Quasigroups as a tool for construction of optimal S-boxes.
Let (Q, ∗) be a finite binary groupoid, i.e. an algebra with one binary
operation ∗ on the non-empty set Q and a, b ∈ Q. A finite binary groupoid
(Q, ∗) is called a quasigroup if for all ordered pairs (a, b) ∈ Q there exist
unique solutions x, y ∈ Q of the equations x ∗ a = b and a ∗ y = b. This
implies the cancellation laws for quasigroup i.e. x ∗a = x′ ∗a⇒ x = x′ and
a ∗ y = a ∗ y′ ⇒ y = y′.
Any quasigroup is possible to be presented as a multiplication table known
as Cayley table. Removing the topmost row and the leftmost column of the
Cayley table of a quasigroup, results in a Latin square.
Assuming that (Q, ∗) is a given quasigroup, for a fixed element l ∈ Q, called
leader, the transformation el : Q
r → Qr is as follows:
el (a0, a1, . . . , ar−1) = (b0, b1, . . . , br−1)⇔
{
b0 = l ∗ a0
bi = bi−1 ∗ ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1
.
The representation of finite quasigroups (Q, ∗), of order n, where n ≥ 2 and
n = 2d as vector valued Boolean functions, can be used. Every Boolean
function f : Fm
2
→ F2, can be uniquely written in its Algebraic Nor-
mal Form (ANF), by which the algebraic degree can be immediately read
off. According to their algebraic degree quasigroups can be divided in two
classes, class of linear quasigroups and class of non-linear quasigroups. The
class of linear quasigroups has a maximal algebraic degree 1, and all other
quasigroups (which maximal algebraic degree is bigger than 1) belong to
the class of non-linear.
Our suggestion is to consider quasigroups as a tool for construction of opti-
mal S-boxes. An algorithm for construction of optimal 4× 4 S-box already
exists [2]. Cryptographically strong 6× 4, 8× 8 and other types of S-boxes
could be produced by extending the above algorithm. First, the number
of rounds and leaders which are necessary to produce Q-S-boxes with the
same quality as already known ones, should be obtained and then, should
be determined which of them belong to the class of optimal ones regarding
to linear and differential characteristics of S-boxes.
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Conclusions
S-boxes play a fundamental role for the security of nearly all modern block
ciphers. They are basically used to hide the relationship between the plain text
and the cipher text. The S-boxes form the only non-linear part of a block ci-
pher. Therefore, S-boxes have to be chosen carefully to make the cipher resistant
against all kinds of attacks. In particular there are well studied criteria that a
good S-box has to fullfill to make the cipher resistant against diferential, linear
and algebraic cryptoanalyses.
An open problem in cryptography is finding an (n × n) bijective S-box with
nonlinearity nl bounded above by 2n−1 − 2
n
2
−1, where n is even, to prevent the
system from attacks by linear approximations, correlation attacks, fast correlation
attacks etc. The proposed problem is in close relation with this, so it is also very
difficult problem for solving (AES have n = 8 and it is not clear that this kind
S-box can be optimal in this dimension). We hope our work helps for moving
things a little bit forward.
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